TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/081390/08130012.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 8.4 KB | 173 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 21

COVER STORIES

Can the U.S. Turn Off Iraq's Oil?


Only tough international action will make sanctions stick

By BRUCE W. NELAN -- Reported by Richard Hornik and Bruce van
Voorst/Washington and Robert Slater/Jerusalem


    Fifty years ago, when Hitler's tanks were poised at the
English Channel and his bombers were pounding London, Franklin
D. Roosevelt decided that the U.S., though still neutral, had
to supply Britain with the military equipment it desperately
needed. "We must admit that there is risk in any course we may
take," F.D.R. said on a national radio broadcast. But backing
America's natural ally "involves the least risk now and the
greatest hope for world peace in the future."

    America's resolution came very late -- almost too late --
in the game. Now the slow reactions that helped produce World
War II are weighing anew on decision makers' minds in the wake
of Iraq's an schluss with Kuwait. A consensus is taking shape
that Saddam Hussein should be punished. More important, he must
be deterred from further aggression.

    "We need to draw a line in the sand," says Les Aspin,
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. General George
Crist, who directed U.S. planning for defense of the Persian
Gulf until he retired in 1988, agrees: "We have to show Saddam
Hussein he can't take another step." The question is how.
Freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and officially deploring
Saddam's behavior are sensible first steps, but largely pro
forma. More pressure will be required for Saddam to feel the
bite.

    After a decade of military buildup and the expensive
creation of a rapid-deployment Central Command to protect oil
supplies from the gulf, Americans naturally wonder: Why not a
military response? The answer is that Iraq is too strong. The
country has 1 million battle-hardened men under arms, plus 500
combat aircraft and 5,500 tanks. The U.S. has no ground troops
in the region; its presence is limited to six medium-size ships
of the Joint Task Force Middle East, based on the island of
Bahrain. The aircraft carrier Independence is steaming toward
a station off the Straits of Hormuz, and the carrier Saratoga
will join the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean, but they would
be hard pressed to roll back Iraq's army.

    Reluctant to talk tough at first, George Bush began to
stress as events sank in, that "all options remain open." But
Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was
doubtful. "I don't think we have a military option at the
moment, nor do we have a treaty obligation," he said. A senior
Pentagon general confirmed, "On the ground, in the short run,
we are not players." Several thousand airborne troops and
Marines could be sent in quickly, but they would be no match
for the 100,000 Iraqis who invaded Kuwait.

    A force of 300,000 would be needed to counter the Iraqis,
Pentagon experts estimate, and "U.S. military operations would
cease everyplace else in the world" in order to move and
support them. Just to get such large numbers to the war zone
would take time. Although light airborne forces could arrive
in a week, heavy units capable of really dealing with the
Iraqis would take more than a month. "If you are going to
defeat Iraq," says Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "it's a hell of a campaign."

    The U.S. could use Navy or Air Force bombers and cruise
missiles to strike military targets in Iraq, but there is no
certainty that such bombardment would have the desired effect.
Saddam's country endured eight years of war with Iran,
including heavy civilian bombing, and did not budge. A U.S.
strike could make Saddam angry enough to send his tanks across
the border into Saudi Arabia. Just as worrisome, the Iraqis
could hold hostage the 3,800 Americans in Kuwait and, in
effect, the population of Kuwait. Eleven Americans were
apparently detained by the invading forces but later turned up
unharmed in Baghdad.

    With no plausible short-term military options, the response
of the West, led by the U.S., can initially be only economic.
American diplomats set to work last week at the United Nations
and in world capitals to produce a resolution imposing
comprehensive sanctions. The object is to keep Iraq from
selling oil and buying arms. The Security Council, reflecting
the new amity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, resolved
that Iraq must withdraw or face further international action.

    Sanctions mandated by the Security Council would be
compulsory for all members. That would make it easier for Japan
and some European countries heavily dependent on Middle Eastern
oil to take a stand against Iraq. Articles 41 and 42 of the
U.N. Charter allow the imposition of a total embargo against
an offending state and "action by air, sea or land forces" to
restore peace and security.

    Experience with sanctions has shown that someone usually
cheats. Oil is particularly easy to sneak through secret
channels. U.S. officials believe that the only truly effective
course would be to keep Iraqi oil bottled up at the well. This
could be done by cutting off the three outlets through which
Iraq exports its crude: two pipelines through Saudi Arabia,
another leading to Turkey, and ships in the Persian Gulf.
Oil-industry and academic experts say Iraq would collapse under
such pressure in a few months or a year.

    Such a plan is more easily proposed than accomplished. The
U.S. last week suggested a tight naval blockade of Iraqi and
Kuwaiti ports, but it has yet to find many takers among its
allies. Halting the oil in the pipelines would mean persuading
Turkey and Saudi Arabia to shut off the tap, or turn a blind
eye while the U.S. blew up the lines. Both countries are
vulnerable to Iraqi reprisals, especially Saudi Arabia.

    After talking with Turkish President Turgut Ozal by phone
last week, Bush said that he and Ozal shared the same "sense
of urgency and concern." Asked if Turkey would be willing to
close the pipeline, Bush replied carefully, "That will be an
option, I'm certain."

    Turkey would probably insist that Saudi Arabia take the same
step, and the Saudi attitude is unclear. Ideally, Washington
would like to see the Arab states stand up to Iraq so that U.N.
resolutions can be pursued as support for initiatives from the
countries most immediately imperiled by the Iraqi threat. In
practice there is little optimism in Washington that the gulf
states will display such toughness. And why should they without
strong -- and credible -- guarantees of protection?

    The entire embargo plan would come apart if the Saudis did
not give it full support. Shutting down the pipeline would be
only the first step for Riyadh. An effective halt to Saddam's
oil exports would eliminate 10% of the free world's supply from
the market. Saudi Arabia would be expected to increase its
output to help make up the shortfall and keep prices from
soaring. That would be another red flag to Saddam. In short,
if an embargo is to work, the U.S. must provide credible
guarantees of military protection to Saudi Arabia. Already there
were proposals in Washington for dispatching a wing of U.S.
fighter aircraft to Saudi bases and even perhaps a brigade
(8,000) of U.S.  troops.

    Yet even with an American security umbrella, the Saudis
would find it difficult to go all out against Iraq. The
underpopulated kingdom would be risking attack by Saddam, from
bombs, rockets and poison-gas-filled missiles to invasion. More
than that, the Saudis would be rejecting attempts at an "Arab
solution" and accepting the high-profile alliance with the U.S.
they have always tried to avoid. Saudi diplomats said privately
last week that such an alliance was dangerous for them because
of America's links with Israel.

    That caution did not stifle the warnings from Washington
that an attack on Saudi Arabia would trigger a wider war. Such
a move by Iraq, said Speaker of the House Thomas Foley, "would
call for a direct military response by the United States."

    This determination closes the vicious circle. The U.S.
cannot fight Iraq on the ground because it has no bases in the
region. It has no bases because the gulf Arabs are unwilling
to be seen collaborating with the friend of their enemy Israel.
Unless all parties can make common cause to stand up to Iraq,
history threatens to repeat itself.